SEP 24 1952

No. 3 of /2 series A

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Department of the Army

SUBJECT:

25X1

Priorities for Intelligence Collection

REFERENCE:

Your memorandum, subject as above, dated

29 August 1952

- 1. In view of the heightened interest in Soviet Bw capabilities which you recognized in your memorandum, it would be appropriate if we discussed the matter in some detail at the next meeting of the IAC. I am planning to circularize my. reply to Secretary Lovett's 16 August memorandum on this problem prior to that meeting.
- 2. It is important that the question of increasing the IN covert collection priority be considered in relation with other top priority requirements. The Interagency Priorities Committee is the appropriate group to deal with this problem wader IAC-D-28/1, dated 30 July 1951; and I am having it referred to the Committee.
- 3. Soviet BW capabilities also bear on the first two national intelligence objectives in DOID 4/2, which provides an adequate basis for review of BW covert collection priorities in the light of Secretary Lovett's letter.

Army and OSD review(s) completed.

WALITER B. SMITH Director

海田区沙

Distribution:

Copy I & 2 - Addressee

3 & 4 - Signer /

5 - DD/I

6 - DD/P31R002900470091-4 Approved Boc Release 2004

8 - AD/IC 11&12 - AD/SI

OSI: IDB; boc (15 Sep 52)

		SIGNATU	JRE RE	CORD	AND	COVER	R SHEET	
DOCUMENT D	JESCRIPTION						BEC.	
O/SI		1					CIA CONTROL NO	ISTRY
		1	2 0		( :#	90164	80164-C	
OC. NO. 24J	4.52	2	T-4.	, -	٠	: 80164 80164-	DATE DOCUMENT REC	CEIVED
OPY NO.		1	60	02	ed ?	10164-	<i>P</i>	Photo Com
OPY NO. 3	of 12	i					LOGGED BY	
UMBER OF ATTACHM	IFNTS 1	i						25
	None	i						
CIA. Access to T nt Top Secret Con ustody in the left- lling should be ind	Top Secret material	is limited to t eceives and/or	those indi	ividuals v	whose offi	ficial duties	entral Intelligence Agency or cla owngraded, destroyed, or transiss relate to the material. Each a taterial will sign this form and in the Top Secret document and	smitted outside of alternate or assist-
REFERRED TO		RECEIVED			RELEA	ASED	SEEN BY	
OFFICE	SIGNATUR	ŁΕ	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE
X1					1554	1		MAI III
05/	ı			L	w.	430		
1.1.	ı			1	16			
(1/0/ /L				<b></b>	Sup	1160		
AAL			1	1 '				
No di			+	<del></del> '	1			
			1 1	1		1		
F			$\overline{}$	<u>'</u>		<del></del>		<b>_</b>
L				, ,	1			2
					+	·		
	- 4				1	L	<u> </u>	
ec. Reg.	- Tike		1	, 1	19/201			
9	11			<del></del>	100			
	17		1					
								+
					1			
					<b></b>			ļ <u>.</u>
			.					
					.			4
			-+		-			
				$\overline{}$	-			
ICE OF DETACHME	ENT: When this form	m is detached	from To	p Secret	t material	it shall be	e completed in the appropriate s	spaces below and
	RIAL DETACHED FROM	TOTAL TOTAL	u.					
VNGRADED		IIIO I OILII	<u></u>			В'	BY (Signature)	
TROYED						1		
TROYED   PATCHED (OUTSIDE C	TO (AL					Ot	OFFICE	DATE

Approved For Releas 2β042661: CIA-RDP80R01731R002900470091 4 Le en out

GPO Ar .

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 . CIA-RDP80R01731R0029004760364

TO: The Director of Central Intelligence

This document consists of 3 pages

No. 3 of 12 series A

PROM:

Beputy Director/Intelligence

SUBJECT: Biological Warfare Intelligence

SEP 1 6 1952

 PROBLEM.—To determine what action should be taken as a result of Secretary of Defense's letter (TAB A), which advises of an acute requirement for more reliable information on Soviet biological warfare activities, capabilities, and intentions.

# 2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

- a. Because of the paucity of information on Soviet BW activities, intelligence estimates are largely limited to the broad assumption that the USSR has a specific BW program. It is obvious that the intelligence support needed for effective programing of corresponding US development of this significant weapon of mass destruction, as well as appropriate defense techniques and countermeasures, is lacking.
- b. Improved collection of BW information is dependent upon a higher priority being accorded to this effort, and upon the development of better requirements. The latter, in turn, is dependent upon better intelligence research and production.

## 3. DISCUSSION.

- a. The failure to collect information which will confirm that the Soviets are or are not engaged in any specific EW activities can be attributed in part to the inherent difficulties in isolating specific EW intelligence targets and accurately determining if EW research is being conducted there. Furthermore, the priority accorded both the covert and special intelligence collection of EW information has been too low to provide a concerted effort by these facilities.
- b. One means of improving the situation described in Secretary Levett's letter would be to increase both the priority accorded by USCIB to the

the BW covert collection effort by the Interagency Priorities Committee. The Department of Defense agencies which also received Secretary Lovett's letter are all represented on USCIB and the IPC.

c. As a result of Secretary Lovett's action, AC of S, G-2, has recommended to the Chairman, IAC, that emphasis be placed on the BW phase of the clandestine collection program.

Reading

25X1

(See TAB M. General Partridge also points out that existing priorities as established by DCID 4/2 place EN and other critical weapons in fifth of seven places. Since Soviet EN capabilities also are related to the first two national intelligence objectives in DCID 4/2, this demonst provides an adequate basis for review by the IPC of M covert collection priorities in the light of Secretary Lovett's letter.

- d. Another handicap to the collection of EW information has been the failure of anyone to develop adequate requirements. Intelligence research and production to date has not isolated the best Soviet EW target, nor has it provided the precise data that would be needed to mount a special operation against such a target.
- e. By agreement reached in the IAC, 14 August (DCID 3/4), primary responsibility for intelligence production in BW is charged to Department of Defense intelligence agencies, and an improved intelligence research effort is largely dependent upon the Services. However, CIA can work to improve the situation within its area of primary responsibility, intelligence production on basic research in the biological sciences (See OSI plan at TAB C).
- f. This Agency can also insure that a coordinated effort is being made to improve BW intelligence by reviewing the problem at an early date in the IAC, and by providing a close working-level relationship through the establishment of a working conference on biological intelligence under the Scientific Estimates Committee.
- 4. CONCLUSIONS.—Within the role of this Agency, the present situation with respect to inadequate information of Soviet BW activities can be improved by taking the following action:
  - a. Increase the BW covert collection effort commensurate with over-all priorities as reviewed and determined by the IPC. (O/IC will raise this question with the IPC at its next meeting, if it is not raised by a Department of Defense representative.)
  - b. Obtain a higher priority from USCIB for exploitation of pertinent special intelligence. (9/SI, with 0/CI, will develop an appropriate presentation to USCIE.)
  - c. Intensify intelligence research and production on basic biological sciences. (See O/SI plan at TAB C.)
  - d. Insure that a fully coordinated plan to improve Bw intelligence is being developed by the intelligence agencies by:

(1) Reviewing the problem at the next meeting of the IAC.
(2) Providing a close interagency working-level relationship through the establishment of a working conference on biological intelligence under the Scientific

Estimates Committee.

# ACTION RECOMMENDED.

- That the actions outlined in paragraph 4 above be approved,
- b. That the Director sign the attached reply to the Secretary of Defense (TAB D).
- That the Chairman, IAC, sign the attached reply to AC of S, G-2, Department of the Army (TaB E).

# LOFTUS E. BECKER Deputy Director/Intelligence

#### ANNEXES:

25X1

- TAB A Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to DCI, dated 16 August 1952, TS No. 63950.
- TAB B Memorandum from AC of S, G-2 to Chairman, IAC, dated 29 August 1952, TS No. 63989.
- TAB C Program for Intensification of O/SI Research and Pro duction in the Biological Sciences, TS No. 80164-A
- TAB D Proposed reply from DCI to Secretary of Defense, TS No. 80164-B.
- TAB E Proposed reply from Chairman, IAC, to AC of S, G-2, TS No. 80164-C.

CONCURRENCES:		
	Director/Flans	17 Sept. 52

# AGTION BY APPROVING AUTHORITY:

			•		. •
		·	Da:	te	
	Approved	(disapproved),	exceptions, if any		
	Distribut Copy 1	ion: & 2 - Addresse & 4 - Signer 5 - DD/I			
		6 - DD/P	Directo	or or Deputy Directo	or
	8 - 4 -44	7 - AD/CI 8 - AC/IC 9 - TSC/OTA	Release 2004/03/11 : C	2+ Supt 52.	red Yevo l
QSI:IDE	boc	Approved For	Release 2004/03/11 : C	:IA-PDP80E01731R092	900470091-4
- 05	11	LC - AD/SI			ou re

NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS:  **TARS A B B B B**  **ATTENTION: This form will be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted doubt and could be a completed on the country of th	*		SIGNATU	ine bi	-con:					
OCE. NO.  OCE. NO.  OCE. NO.  OCE. NO.  OCE. DATE  OURSER OF PAGES  UNUBER OF ATACCHMENTS  SATISTATION WILL be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the Chis form will be attached to each Top Secret document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of the control of Discr who receives and/or releases the attached Top Secret material will be material. Each afternate or assistantly of the light-hand columns, as seen that the property of the control of the Chisad columns provided. The name of each individual who has ease the Top Secret document and the date of has BURBO TO FEE SIGNATURE  OFFICE SIGNATURE  DATE TIME DATE TIME NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL  DATE  THE NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL  DATE  THE NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL  DATE  THE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and assembled to Central Top Secret Control for record.	•		SIGNATU	RE KE	COKL	) AND	COV	ER SHEET		
DOE, DATE  DOESN'S A, B, C, D, &  TIENTION: This form will be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret Particular to Class and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted on the Class. A cross to Top Secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties relate to the material. Each alternate until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted to Class. The Class are considered to the material. Each alternate until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted to Class. The Class are considered to the material. Each alternate until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted to Class and the Class are considered to the material. Each alternate until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted to the material. Each alternate until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted to the material. Each alternate until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted to the material is immediated period of the material is generally and the properties of the material. Each alternate until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted to the material is the material to the material. Each alternate until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted to the material is shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and namewited to Central Top Secret Control for record.  TIPLE OF DELECHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and namewited to Central Top Secret Material Each alternate until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted to Central Top Secret Material Each alternate until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or the material is influenced to the material is influenced.  TIPLE OF	SOURCE	DESCRIPTION								BISTRY
WITEMION: This forms will be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CLA and will remain stateched to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of IA. Access to Top Secret material is limited to excurent until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside or IA. Access to Top Secret material is limited to excure the control Officer who receives and/or releases the attached Top Secret to the material. Each alternate or assistantively in the left-hand columns provided. The name of each individual who has seen the Top Secret document and the date of hands who will be indicated in the right-hand columns.  **BERISED TO SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED TO NAME TIME DATE TIME NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL DATE  **STACK STACK S	DOC. NO.			>					80164	
ATTENDENT OF ATTACHEMENTS  AT	CODY NO		1	Too	£ ·	ب ا	0164	B &	DATE DOCUMENT RE	ECEIVED
THERE TO SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:    STONED	NUMBER OF PAGES	2		W.	TJ.	# 8	0164	- C	LOGGED BY	
OFFICE SIGNATURE DATE TIME DATE TIME NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL DATE  X1 SA	ATTENTION: This f within the CIA a CIA. Access to ? ant Top Secret Co custody in the left	form will be attached and will remain attached. Top Secret material is ontrol Officer who recit-hand columns provide them.	to each Top S thed to the do is limited to the ceives and/or re-	hose indi	ividuals	whose off	ficial dut	ties relate to t	the material. Each	smitted outside of alternate or assist
THE NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL DATE  THE NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL DATE  SECONDARY OF SECO		CICNATUDI			<del></del>				SEEN BY	
NI STROYED SERRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:  BY (Signature)  BY (Signature)	X1 S/	SIGNATURE		DATE	TIME	15 90	•	NAME AN	ND OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE
OTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and ransmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.  WE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:  BY (Signature)  BY (Signature)	3 C			r		Leg	114	0		
DTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and ansmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.  IE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:  DWINGRADED  STROYED  STROYED	X1 XIA									
OTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and ansmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.  IE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:  DWINGRADED  STROYED   STROYED   BY (Signature)										
OTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and ransmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.  HE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:  DWNGRADED   ESTROYED   BY (Signature)										
ESTROYED	Sec. Tong.	John .				9/43	/		<u></u> ł	
HE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:  DWNGRADED   ESTROYED   BY (Signature)										
BY (Signature)				_						
BY (Signature)  STROYED   BY (Signature)										
BY (Signature)  STROYED   BY (Signature)										
HE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:  DWNGRADED   ESTROYED   BY (Signature)										
HE TOP SECRET MATERIAL DETACHED FROM THIS FORM WAS:  DWNGRADED   ESTROYED   BY (Signature)	OTICE OF DETACHN	MENT: When this form	n is detached	from To	op Secre	t materia	1 it shall	he completer	fin the annualists	
DWNGRADED		Top Beeret Cont.	aron ion record.	4.				T		spaces below and
	OWNGRADED		THE POPULATION				-	BY (Signature	e)	
SPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) TO OFFICE DATE	SPATCHED (OUTSIDE	CIA) TO						OFFICE	-	DATE

2

2

2

25X1

The Secretary of Defense Washington

Top Secret Authorization

Name\_BFT Date Aug 15 1952

> Noted in DCI log.

16 Aug 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Biological Warfare Intelligence

There is an acute requirement for more reliable information regarding Soviet activities, capabilities and intentions concerning biological warfare

The difficulties inherent in gethering intelligence on this subject are recognized. However, the continuing need for more complete and reliable information appears to dictate an accelerated emphasis on biological warfare intelligence. I am forwarding a similar memorandum to Defense Department intelligence agencies and would appreciate any action you deem appropriate to assist in accomplishing this extremely important objective.

(Signed) Robert Lovett

2								
		SIGNAT	URE RI	ECORI	D AND	COV	ER SHEET	
		- <u> </u>						
	T DESCRIPTION			***************************************				REGISTRY
SOURCE Lovett/C	∩an	1					CIA CONTROL NO.	
DOC. NO. TS O							63950	
	0234 Aug 52	1					DATE DOCUMENT	
	aug 52	ł					8/18	
NUMBER OF PAGES		1					LOGGED BY	
NUMBER OF ATTACH		1					mas	
None		1		•				
ant Top Secret C custody in the lef dling should be in	Top Secret material:	l is limited to t eccives and/or wided. The n t-hand column	those indi	lividuals	whose off	fficial duti	Central Intelligence Agency or downgraded, destroyed, or tra cies relate to the material. Eac material will sign this form an een the Top Secret document a	insmitted outside of
REFERRED TO OFFICE		RECEIVED			RELEA	ASED	SEEN BY	
	SIGNATUR	₹E	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE
X1/	1	1			15 ge	T		
31	1	!		<del></del>	50/	1630		
62	1			1	9/16	1	r	
0001		0			1/. >	114	0	
1. 6 7.2					1/25			
1	1				423			
							!	
			1					
				-				
NOTICE OF DETACHN	MENT: When this form	m is detached	from To	p Secret	material	l it shall	be completed in the appropriat	e spaces below and
	ERIAL DETACHED FROM T							
DOWNGRADED [			<del></del>				BY (Signature)	
DESTROYED								!
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE	CIA) TO						OFFICE	DATE

FORM NO. 38-13

25

C O P

25X1

Top Secret Authorization

### THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington

16 August 1952

TSC-- 2580-2
TOP SECRET CONTROL SECTION
A. C. of S., G-2, DA

LIEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE MAVY
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Biological Warfare Intelligence

1. There is an acute requirement for more reliable information regarding Soviet activities, capabilities and intentions concerning biological warfare. Current intelligence on this

- 2. The difficulties inherent in gathering intelligence on this subject are recognized. However, the continuing need for more complete and reliable information appears to dictate an accelerated emphasis on biological warfare intelligence.
- 3. For your information, I am inclosing a copy of a similar memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

1

			SIGNAT	UKE KI	ECORE	AND	COV	ER SHEET			
DO	CUMENT D	ESCRIPTION									
SOURCE										STRY	
Dept	of	TERV							CIA CONTROL NO.		
DOC. NO. C	airm	in IAC							63989 DATE DOCUMENT RE	CENTED	
DOC. DATE 2	9 Aug	z 52									
COPY NO.	20	118							30 Aug 52		
NUMBER OF I		1									
NUMBER OF A	ATTACHM	ENTS							ebw		
		_1								•	
CIA. Account Top Secustody in dling should	ess to T cret Co the left- d be inc	op Secret material	is limited to	those ind	lividuals	whose of	ficial du	ties relate to th	gence Agency or cla destroyed, or trans ne material. Each sign this form and ecret document and	mitted outside of alternate or assist-	
REFERRED 1	ГО		RECEIVED		7	RELE	ASED	T	SEEN BY		
OFFICE		SIGNATU	RE	DATE	TIME	DATE TIME		NAME AN	D OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	
25X1	Г					500	ŧ		This of	DATE	
5						50	1630			The state of the s	
1	1					9/				- 12	
II I ECEL	/					1/16	110	روا			
ILLEGIS			//	1	,	1	1				
7000	7/										
						41	<u> </u>	<u> </u>			
L						1/2	-				
						1					
						<del>                                     </del>	<u> </u>				
							ļ				
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		<del> </del>						
								Ì			
								l			
								İ			
1					,						
		<del></del>									
	1										
1											
<del></del>											
1	1										
<del></del>											
ı											
transmitted	ETACHM to Cent	ENT: When this for ral Top Secret Cor	m is detached	d from T	op Secre	t materia	l it shall	be completed	in the appropriate	spaces below and	
		RIAL DETACHED FROM						1			
DOWNGRADED			INIS FURM WA	10:		<del></del>		BY (Signature	)		
	<u> </u>							_		Į.	
DISPATCHED (O		CIA) TO									
DISTRICTED (O	GISIDE (	-in) 10						OFFICE		DATE	

FORM NO. 38-13

Anna of

The document	consists	of	
3 3 of 12			

# PROGRAM FOR INTERSIFICATION OF O/SI RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION IN THE MICLOGICAL SCIENCES

- l. As a result of the recent ISC decision on division of responsibility in the scientific and technical field, O/SI is recrienting the work of the Biology Division and has or is undertaking the following steps to intensify its effort in this field. This is in keeping with Mr. Lovett's request.
  - a. Assignment of personnel in the Biology and Medicine Divisions to engage in the systematic survey of the open literature now available on the subject, directed at the development of more adequate collection guidance.
  - b. Exploration of the possibilities for assistance in this regard through recrientation or expansion of external research contracts.
  - c. Consultation with the State Department Science Adviser and those responsible for administering the publications procurement program to examine (1) what additional steps can be taken immediately to extend the collection of epen literature abroad, and (2) what steps are possible to attempthen the scientific and agricultural attache systems in the direction of more adequate collection of biological information.
  - d. There is no appropriate specialist presently assigned to the Scientific Division \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ to provide guidance to covert collection and to conduct overt collection of biological marfare information. O/SI intends to provide two scientific intelligence officers for this work in the near future.
  - e. O/SI currently is pursuing the exploitation of special intelligence on a systematic basis in the field of biology. This cannot be intensified unless collection and processing in this field is increased by AFS. This is in turn contingent upon appropriate USCIB action.

	Appro	ved Re	lease 2	404 G	ECRE	A-RDF	P80R01731R002900470091	-4
		SIGNATI	JRE RE	CORE	AND	COVI	ER SHEET	
							in the state of	
SOURCE .	T DESCRIPTION						REGIST	RY
O/SI	,						CIA CONTROL NO.	Y.,
DOC. NO.							80164-A	
DOC. DATE							DATE DOCUMENT RECE	IIVED
COPY NO.	of 12						LOGGED BY	
NUMBER OF PAGES NUMBER OF ATTACH		1						25
	None							
CIA. Access to ant Top Secret C custody in the lef dling should be in	Top Secret material	l is limited to t receives and/or	those indi	ividuals	whose of	fficial dutie	Central Intelligence Agency or class downgraded, destroyed, or transmits relate to the material. Each almaterial will sign this form and intention the Top Secret document and the contract of the Top Secret document and the Top	itted outside of ternate or assist-
REFERRED TO		RECEIVED			RELE	EASED	SEEN BY	
OFFICE	SIGNATUR	RE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE
5X1 <b>5</b> {					20	/630		
Let	<b> </b>	,			1/16	1140		
0001								
			_					
						-		
NOTICE OF DETACH	MENT: When this for	rm is detached	from To	on Secret	materia	1 it shall	be completed in the appropriate sp	
- designation to Oct	entral Top Secret Con TERIAL DETACHED FROM	unor for record	a.	P	Hitta			aces below and
OOWNGRADED [		11110 1 0	<u>-</u>				BY (Signature)	
DESTROYED								
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE	I CIA) TO						OFFICE	DATE

Approved For Release 440 4 E CIA-RD - 80R01731R0029004

FORM NO. 38-13